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How to End Civil Wars: Approaches to Peace at the example of 
the Syrian Crisis 
Introduction 
The Syrian civil war grew out of the 2011 Arab Spring.1 Violence erupted when protestors called 
for President Assad’s removal, protests which he as violently suppressed. The war developed into 
a multiparty civil war, with rebels from various sides (Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, for example) fighting 
amongst each other and against the Presidential powers. The war got notorious when the Islamic 
State, an offspring of the notorious terrorist group Al Qaeda, got into the headlines for the excesses 
of violence. Worries were caused by individuals from the West to travel to Syria to join the Islamic 
State in their struggle2, and a refugee crisis to the West3, which dominated the headlines for months, 
arguably caused by struggle and strife not only in Syria but in the wider region. In October 2015, 
Russia intervened in the war,4 which resulted in a near global confrontation between the West and 
Russia, which arguably could have escalated the war into a world war.5 At this time, it seemed that 
the Islamic State and Russia were the most dangerous parties in this conflict. However, Russia 
1 Cf. Micallef, Joseph (2015): The Islamic State. Its History, Ideology and Challenge. Vancouver: 
Antioch Downs; McHugo, John (2015): Syria: A recent history. London: Saqi; Erlich, Reese (2014): 
Inside Syria. The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect. Amerst: 
Prometheus Books; Kilcullen, David (2016): Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War 
on Terror. London: C. Hurst.  
2  Wood, Graeme (2015): What ISIS really wants. The Atlantic. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.  
3 Kingsley, Patrick (2016): The New Odyssee: The Story of Europe’s Refugee Crisis. London: 
Guardian Faber; Lesser, Ian at al. (2015): The Refugee Crisis: Perspectives from Across Europe 
and the Atlantic. Brussels: German Marshall Fund of the United States.    
4 Alhadeff, Iakovos (2015): The Russian Expeditions in Afghanistan and Syria. Amazon Digital 
Edition: Kindle; Quinn, Ben (2016): Russia’s military action in Syria: timeline. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/russias-military-action-in-syria-timeline.   
5 The situation resembled the Cuban Missile Crisis, the only situation in the Cold War where the 
US and Russia were close to a direct clash. In 2015, also, like in the Cuban Missile Crisis, threats 
with the use of nuclear weapons were made.  
Cornelia Beyer
2 
 
initially seemed to fight other rebel groups with deplorable violence,6 and only slowly could be 
convinced to target ISIS. Measures that were taken to de-escalate the conflict having even wider 
implications were an aid programme towards Syria in general7 and the attempt to integrate Russia 
into the global efforts to counter ISIS, to solve the re-activated Security Dilemma8. 
There are at least three points to mention, that could be done with regards to Syria now, derived 
from the discussion above:  
                                                          
6 Itani, Faysal and Hossam Abouzahr (2016): Lessons from Russia’s intervention in Syria. The 
Atlantic Council. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/lessons-from-russia-s-
intervention-in-syria.     
7 Cf. European Commission (2017): Syrian Crisis. 
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf.  
8 8 Cf. Booth, K. and N. J. Wheeler (2008): The Security Dilemma. Fear, Cooperation and Trust in 
World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave; Adler, E. and M. Barnett (eds. 1998): Security Communities. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bunde, T. and T. Noetzel (2010): Unavoidable Tensions: 
The Liberal Path to Global NATO. Contemporary Security Policy, 31:2, 295-318; Collins, A. 
(1997): The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War. New York: St. Martin’s Press; Collins, 
A. (2004): State-Induced Security Dilemma. Maintaining the Tragedy. Cooperation and Conflict: 
Journal of the Nordic Studies Association, 39:1, 27-44; Craig, C. (2004): Glimmer of a New 
Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz. New York: Columbia 
University Press; Daalder, I. and J. Goldgeier (2006): Global NATO. Foreign Affairs, 85, 105-113; 
Glaser, C. L. (1997): The Security Dilemma Revisited. World Politics, 50:1, 171-201; Herz, J. H. 
(1950): Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 2:2, 157-180; Herz, J.H. 
(1951): Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theory and Realities. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press; Jervis, R. (1978): Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30:2, 
167-214; Jones, S. G. (2003): The European Union and the Security Dilemma. Security Studies, 
12:3, 114-156; Kupchan, C. et al. (1999): Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of 
International Order. New York: United Nations University Press; Mitrany, D. (1966): A Working 
Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle Books; Mowle, T. S. and D.H. Sacko (2007): Global NATO: 
Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World. Contemporary Security Policy, 28:3, 597-618; Shiping, T. 
(2009): The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis. Security Studies, 18:3, 587-623; Snyder, G. 
H. (1984): The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics, 36:4, 461-495; Wheeler, N. 
and K. Booth (1992): The Security Dilemma. In: Baylis, J. and N. J. Rengger (eds.): Dilemma of 
World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World. Oxford Clarendon Press, 29-60. 
8 CF. Daalder, I. and J. Goldgeier (2006): Global NATO. Foreign Affairs, 85, 105-113; Mowle, T.S. 
and D.H. Sacko (2007): Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World. Contemporary 
Security Policy, 28:3, 597-618; Bunde, T. and T. Noetzel (2010): Unavoidable Tensions: The 
Liberal Path to Global NATO. Contemporary Security Policy, 31:2, 295-318; The Royal United 
Services Institute (2012). John Ikenberry Opposes a Global NATO. Online: 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xvm92n_john-ikenberry-opposes-a-global-nato_news. 
However, while these publications do speak for an expansion of NATO towards the East, they do 
not go as far as calling for an integration of Russia into NATO.  
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First, with regards to the Islamic State, it would be necessary to try to negotiate with the group and 
other actors in this war and offer them some territory that they can administer in exchange for a 
cessation of violence and respect for human rights.9 Negotiation with terrorists is something that 
is often opposed, but most governments do negotiate with terrorists. The conflict in Northern 
Ireland, for example, would not have come to an end without negotiation and some sort of 
compromise.10 In addition, in any negotiation, something needs to be offered. So, because the 
main goal of the Islamic State is to create a state that is governed under Islamic principles, one 
could negotiate with the group by offering some territory that it could control, as long as it cedes 
violence and respects human rights. All sides would need to agree to cede violence, the Islamic 
State and those that fight it.  
This raises the question what can be made a topic in the negotiations with ISIS and other actors. 
This article argues for two points: 
1) A Marshall Plan for Syria, 
2) Integration of Russia into the NATO-led efforts with the goal to re-integrate Russia into 
NATO long term.  
However, more importantly, this article makes an argument about the causes of the civil war in 
Syria, looking at Psychology and mental health in particular. It has become a more established 
                                                          
9 Faure, Guy O. and William Zartman (2011): Negotiating with terrorists. London: Routledge; 
Dolnik, Adam et al. (2007): Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists. New York: 
Praeger; Rice, Mitchell B. (2010): Negotiating with Evil: When to talk to terrorists. New York: 
Open Road; Powell, Jonathan (2015): Terrorists at the Table: Why Negotiation is the Only Way 
to Peace. New York: St. Martin’s Press; Feste, Karen A. (2010): Terminate Terrorism: Framing, 
Gaming, and Negotiating Conflicts. London: Routledge; Bond, Dottie (2016): Negotiating with 
Separatist Terrorists. London: LAP Lambert; Turner, C. (2015): How terrorism ends: A 
comparative conflict analysis of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica. PhD thesis at 
the University of Hull, UK; Bew, J.; Frampton, M. I. Gurruchaga. 2009. Talking to Terrorists. 
Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. London: Hurst & Company; Cronin, 
A.K. 2009. How Terrorism Ends. Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Goerzig, C. 2010. Talking to Terrorists. Concessions and 
the renunciation of violence. London: Routledge; Powell, J. 2015. Talking to Terrorists: How to 
End Armed Conflicts. London: Vintage.     
10 Adams, Gerry (1996): Before the Dawn. An Autobiography. London: Mandarin.  
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position that political violence, such as insurgencies and terrorism, stem from trauma, which 
connects neatly all the previously existing literature on the causes of terrorism and the psychology 
of terrorism together. Trauma has also become a marker for mental health concerns. This means, 
we need to take a look at mental health to understand wars more widely, and in turn mental health 
problems globally can maybe aid us predicting violence such as the civil war in Syria in the future.  
This article will take up – from the above – the discussion of mental health with the call to establish 
an Early Warning System for War based on mental health data as well as briefly discuss the idea to 
follow this up with a Marshall Plan and intensive foreign aid towards civil war countries, such as 
Syria. The former fits in neatly with the WHO Mental Health Action Plan 2020.11 For this purpose, 
the article will first discuss the relevant literature on ISIS, on the psychological and economic 
causes of terrorism, and then move on to discuss how they can be addressed long term with an 
Early Warning System for War based on mental health data and following this interventions with 
soft tools, hence the recommendation of a Marshall Plan for Syria now.12  
 
Literature Review  
On Syria and ISIS 
In Syria after the Arab Spring a civil war developed. We could have talked about a failed state then 
with regards to Syria. Failed states are states in which government does not function anymore, and 
various factions are fighting each other.13 While a failed state does not necessarily have to develop 
into civil war, in the case of Syria it did. Failed states have a long history – at least since the end of 
                                                          
11  World Health Organisation (2013): Comprehensive mental health action plan 2013-2020. 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/action_plan_2013/en/.  
12 Brown, Gordon (2016): The Syrian refugee crisis calls for a new Marshall Plan. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/04/gordon-brown-syrian-refugee-
crisis-marshall-plan; Crilly, Rob (2016): Former US General calls for Marshall Plan for the 
Middle East. The National. http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/former-us-general-
calls-for-marshall-plan-for-the-middle-east 
13 Kaldor, Mary (2012): New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. London: Polity; 
Rotberg, Robert I. (2002): Failed States in a World of Terror. Foreign Affairs, 81:4, 127-140. 
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the Cold War – to be in the academic spotlight as a cause for concern and as the main concern for 
international security. Failed states were an important topic in the 1990s, when genocides and civil 
wars such as in Rwanda took place. What we seem to know about civil wars is that often they are 
caused by what Ostby and others have termed horizontal inequalities, hence inequalities between 
ethnic groups.14 So, in Rwanda, for example, this would mean inequality between the Hutus and 
the Tutsis. Inequality manifests for example in reduced status for one group, with less access to 
resources, such as medium and high status jobs and possibilities for effective participation and 
presence in political offices. This is thought to contribute to humiliation.15 Humiliation has been 
connected to the emotion of shame, and anger, and both of them are thought to contribute to the 
eruption of violence. Shame can be created when insults – and inequality could be such an insult 
– are not dealt with in a socially constructive manner. Braithwaite calls this unacknowledged 
shame.16 The literature on shame looked in particular at the Second World War and why it occurred 
and connected the emotion of shame to the personality of Hitler and why he developed his 
schemes and why he attracted support from the German population. Shame, in the case of 
Germany, was caused by the Treaty of Versailles, in which Germany was attributed the guilt for 
the First World War, as well as high reparation payments towards victorious powers. This resulted 
in a feeling of betrayal and humiliation in Germany, which Hitler played on. He promised the 
Germans to make Germany ‘great again’, and in the dire situation that Germany found itself in the 
                                                          
14 Cf. Ostby, Gudrun (2003): Horizontal Inequalities and Civil War: Do Ethnic Group Inequalities 
Influence the Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict? Thesis at the Department of Sociology and 
Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology and Centre for the Study of 
Civil War, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway; Cederman, L.E.; 
Weidman, N.B. and K.S. Gleditsch (2011): Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: 
A Global Comparison. American Political Science Review, 105:03, 478-495; Stewart, F. (2010): 
Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict: a review of CRISE findings. Oxford: Centre for 
Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity.    
15  Lindner, E. (2006): Making Enemies. Humiliation and International Conflict. Westport & 
London: Praeger Security International. 
16 Braithwaite, J. (1989): Crime, shame and reintegration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Braithwaite, J. (2001): Foreword. In: Scheff, T. and S. Retzinger: Emotions and Violence: Shame 
and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. Lincoln: iUniverse, viv-xv, xi. 
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interwar years – with the Great Depression in addition to the aftereffects of the First World War 
– this promise seemed very attractive.17  
Now, the question is if we can learn something from this for explaining the civil war in Syria. 
Potentially, we could explain it when looking at the Islamic State that it plays on a similar 
justification for its violence. The Islamic State is influenced by a branch of Islam that is called 
Sunni, utilising ideas from Wahhabism and Salafism18. There are at least two major branches, one 
Shia and one Sunni. One possible explanation is this: In Iraq, while there was a quasi-civil war or 
a civil war going on, and while there were attempts to create a functioning state, the Sunni were 
relatively marginalised, at least in their own perspective. Other groups, in particular the Shia and 
Kurds, had, as some believe, and advantage and some believe even attempted to destroy political 
Sunni Islam.19 The Sunni seem to have had a more prominent place in power in Iraq before the 
intervention of the Western coalition in 2003, but were pushed out of power afterwards, while the 
Shia and the Kurds were preferred. In addition, the Islamic State is an offspring of Al Qaeda, also 
Sunni, and which had been under attack in Afghanistan since 2001.20 This might have created a 
similar situation as in Germany after the First World War, with humiliation as a factor. The Islamic 
                                                          
17 Scheff, T. and S. Retzinger (2001): Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive 
Conflicts. Lincoln: iUniverse.   
18 Wood, Graeme (2015): What ISIS really wants. The Atlantic. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/; 
Lister, Charles R. (2015) : The Syrian Jihad. London: Hurst; McCants, William (2015): The ISIS 
Apocalypse. New York: St. Martin’s Press; Stern, Jessica and J.M. Berger (2015): ISIS: The State 
of Terror. London: HarperCollins; Weiss, Michael and Hassan Hassan (2015): ISIS: Inside the 
Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts.   
19 Cf. Khalife, Nabil (2017): The Attempt to Uproot Sunni-Arab Influence. A Geo-Strategic 
Analysis of the Western, Isreali and Iranian Quest for Domination. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic 
Press. Khalife discussed the view that the international community is determined to weaken, even 
destroy, political Sunnism. Cf. also Collins, Tim (2015): Syria’s Sunni Muslims need a homeland of 
their own. The Guardian. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11915469/Syrias-Sunnis-need-
a-homeland-of-their-own.html; Martins, Alice (2016): ISIS: A Catastrophe for Sunnis. The 
Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2016/11/23/isis-a-catastrophe-
for-sunnis/?utm_term=.fc6fb2b976a4.  
20 Mason, Noah (2015): ISIS: The Comprehensive Insight into Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. New 
York: Createspace, Atwan, Abdel Bari (2015): The Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate. London: 
Saqi.  
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State, as a Sunni group, probably plays on this humiliation, even though the main activity was in 
Syria, not Iraq.   
First, in Syria we have at least three fighting factions: The government under President Assad, the 
Islamic State, and rebel groups, such as the Kurds and others. In the case of Syria, it is interesting 
that we refer to the Islamic States as the terrorists, but not to the rebel groups. Probably, these 
definitions are applied because the other groups don’t use the same level of violence. But then it 
would also not make sense to talk about the Islamic State as a terrorist group, but rather as an 
insurgency or a revolution or whatnot. The Islamic State is not the same as what we traditionally 
have known as terrorism, even though it does employ terrorist tactics and methods. It is more than 
a traditional terrorist group, because it controls a large territory, and provides – or at least did until 
recently – over substantial resources, such as access to oil fields and military equipment.21 It also 
applied forms of violence that had not been used by terrorists in the past, such as mass scale killings 
of civilians in their own homeland and genocides of both members of their own religion as well 
as from other religions.22 Similar to the terrorism we have seen before with Al Qaeda, though, it is 
religiously inspired. It is inspired by an extreme interpretation of the Qur’an and Islam. For 
example, the Islamic State argues that they are in a struggle that will result in the coming of the 
Apocalypse.23 This is thought to be the final showdown between the forces of good and evil. While 
it is not clear if this interpretation is derived from the Qur’an, it is present in some of the literature 
that the Islamic State uses for its ideology. The extreme religious motivation of the Islamic State 
                                                          
21 Cf. Lister, Charles R. (2015) : The Syrian Jihad. London: Hurst, Solomon, Erika et al (2016): 
Inside ISIS Inc: The journey of a barrel of oil. Financial Times, http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/isis-
oil/.  
22 Shaheen, Kareem (2016): Up to 15.000 ISIS victims buried in mass graves in Syria and Iraq – 
survey. The Guardian.  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/up-to-15000-bodies-
may-be-buried-in-mass-graves-in-syria-and-iraq-survey; Holpuch, Amanda (2016): ISIS atrocities 
against religious minorities are genocide, says US House. The Guardian.  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/15/isis-genocide-of-religious-minorities-us-
house-statement.  
23  Byman, D. (2015): Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement. What 
Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press, McCant, William (2016): The ISIS 
Apocalypse: The History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. New York: Picador.  
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can probably explain why other groups were attacked by them (such as the Kurds and Christians, 
as well as others) and why they destroyed Christian heritage sites in the region. It is difficult to see 
how it can explain why ISIS conducted substantial human rights violations within their territory.   
Let us continue to look into terrorism and explanations for this. Terrorism is caused by many 
different factors, among which count military interventions24, exclusion25, deprivation26, lack of 
democracy 27, religion 28, trauma 29 etc. The following will deal mainly with psychological and 
economic factors.  
 
Psychology and Terrorism30  
Isolation, Exclusion and Inequality 
For terrorism, some causal factors seem to be similar to those that cause mental illness. First, 
recently, the long held belief of the mentally healthy terrorist has been challenged. Some studies 
and scholars purported the belief that terrorists and radicalised individuals are to be found more 
in the isolated and depressed parts of society, both in the West as well as in the Middle East31. 
                                                          
24 Beyer, Cornelia (2016): Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire. London: Routledge.  
25  Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New 
Discipline. London: Palgrave.   
26 A debate is going on in how far deprivation, poverty, inequality, overall economic factors, 
contribute to terrorism. See for a critical contribution Bjorgo, T. (2004): Root Causes of Terrorism. 
Myths, reality and ways forward. Abingdon, Routledge, ch. 3 and p. 132. 
27 Cf. for example Li, Q. (2005): Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist 
Incidents? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49:2, 278-297.   
28 Juergensmeyer, M. (2003): Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.  
29  Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New 
Discipline. London: Palgrave.   
30 Parts of the following have been reproduced with generous permission from Beyer, Anna 
Cornelia (2016): International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New Discipline. London: 
Palgrave.  
31 Bhui, K. et al. (2014): Might Depression, Psychosocial Adversity, and Limited Social Assets 
Explain Vulnerability to and Resistance against Violent Radicalisation? PLoS ONE 9(9): e105918. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105918; Navarro, J. (2009): Unmasking Terrorists – Two Critical 
Characteristics! Psychology Today. Online: 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/spycatcher/200912/unmasking-terrorists-two-critical-
characteristics; Krishnan, M. (2014): Terrorism expert says isolation driving Calgarians to join ISIL. 
Calgary Herald. Online: http://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/terrorism-expert-says-
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Furthermore, Silke mentions marginalisation as a cause of terrorism, which hints at processes of 
exclusion and deprivation, essentially a migration of the individual or group to the fringes of society, 
similar to mental illness 32 . Deprivation and poverty are hotly contested in the literature on 
terrorism. Some authors33 contend that relative deprivation is responsible for a large percentage of 
terrorism. 
Furthermore, more recently Borum has identified several vulnerabilities, which are responsible for 
terrorism34. One of them is that there needs to be a need to belong, which is essential in his 
explanation: A feeling of being disconnected from society and a need to integrate into a group, 
which provides with meaning and purpose. Horgan has confirmed the need to integrate into a 
group as a primary motivation to join terrorism 35. Both would confirm the hypothesis that 
radicalization, as the preceding stage to terrorism, is causally connected to isolation first.  
 
Socio-psychology 
Trauma can be connected to the literature on terrorism. There have been theories going back to 
Freud where Narcicism has been connected to terrorist violence as well as a negative identity 
formation36. Narcicism develops when a person is smothered in their childhood and later on fails 
                                                          
isolation-driving-calgarians-to-join-isil; Merari, A. et al. (2009): Personality Characteristics of “Self 
Martyrs”/ “Suicide Bombers” and Organizers of Suicide Attacks. Terrorism and Political Violence. 
22:1, 87-101; Merari, A. (2010): Driven to Death. New York: Oxford University Press; Lankford, 
A. (2011): Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidal? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34:4, 
337-366. One study argues that depression is highest in the world in the Middle East, where most 
international terrorism is stemming from. Cf. Cousins, S. (2013): The Middle East and North 
Africe suffer the world’s highest depression rates, according to new research. Middle East Monitor. 
Online:  https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/8335-the-middle-east-and-north-
africa-suffer-the-worlds-highest-depression-rates-according-to-new-research-. 
32 Silke, A. (2003): Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and 
its Consequences. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.  
33 Beyer, C. (2016): Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire. London: Routledge; 
Beyer, A.C. (2014): Inequality and Violence: A Re-appraisal of Man, the State and War. London: 
Routledge. 
34 Borum, R. (2004): Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida. 
35 Horgan, J. (2014): The Psychology of Terrorism. New York: Routledge. 
36 Borum, R. (2004): Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida. 
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to adapt their egocentric personality by testing it against reality. The world is increasingly seen as 
evil and the self inflated as good. This makes the basis for attributing blame to others for perceived 
injustices. The negative identity hypothesis posits that children perceive their father figure as 
rejecting. From this onwards, they develop an aversion towards authority, which then is not only 
directed against their own father, but in the long run also against the state as an authority. They 
develop an identity, which rejects all authority and come in conflict first with the law and then with 
the state. In fact, it has been found that sociologically many terrorist have been found to have had 
family problems, such as divorce or death in the family, and had offended and been in conflict 
with the law before them becoming terrorists.37  
A more prominent hypothesis is the frustration aggression hypothesis. It was established by 
psychologists to explain how aggression occurs in people, and the interesting finding in psychology 
is that much aggression is caused by negative stimuli38. For example, in experiments with animals 
and humans it has been found that stressors such as noise, heat and overcrowding lead to higher 
levels of aggression. Pain, obviously, is a strong aggressor. With regards to heat it has even been 
found that under hot conditions, such as in summer time, there are more crimes conducted than 
when it is cold. These kind of stimuli led some previous researchers to conclude that frustration 
could cause aggression. Frustration refers to a stress situation in which goals a thwarted and needs 
cannot be fulfilled39. This connects to Maslows needs theory in which basic and more higher needs 
have to be fulfilled as the primary motivating force for humans more generally40. If need fulfillment 
– or goal fulfillment – is hindered, this leads to frustration, and in many cases this is a precursor 
                                                          
37 Borum, R. (2004): Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida. Traumata in 
youth, though, are per se not a good predictor for determining who will become a terrorist as many 
people experience these problems and never consider terrorism 
38 Berkowitz, L. (1993):  Aggression: Its Causes, Consequences and Control. New York: McGraw 
– Hill Higher Education. 
39 Dollard, J. et al. (1939): Frustration and aggression. Yale: Yale University Press. 
40 Maslow, A.H. (2013): A Theory of Human Motivation. Uitgever: Wilder Publications. 
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for aggression.41 But the mechanism has been established in the literature and Ted Robert Gurr 
applied it to explain why men rebel, in a publication with the same title. He referred to frustration 
being caused by relative deprivation, which refers essentially to relative poverty42. Kruglanski finally 
mentions trauma (and frustration) as a cause for suicide terrorism43. 
The traumata in the region stem, for example, from repeated interventions and economic 
backwardness.44  
 
Psycho-biology 
There is little literature on the psycho-biology of terrorism. In the discussion, however, is the 
finding that, similar to mental illness, both suicidal behaviour and aggression are linked to an 
imbalance in neurotransmitters, especially serotonin and dopamine. Serotonin hypofunction and 
dopamine hyperfunction have been linked to aggression, suicide and depression 45. A lack of 
cortisol and an excess of testosterone have similarly been found present in aggression46. Studies 
on the neurobiology of terrorism are still outstanding, but could possibly confirm these 
connections.  
 
                                                          
41 Initially, the researchers believed that frustration always leads to aggression, but they revised this 
hypothesis to argue that it is a possible cause. In people who just don’t have the opportunities for 
aggression or who are generally more passive – learned helplessness is a keyword here – aggression 
does not need to occur from frustration. 
42 Gurr, T. R. (1971): Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
43 Victoroff, J. (2009): Suicide Terrorism and the Biology of Significance. Political Psychology, 30:3, 
397-400.  
44 Beyer, Cornelia (2016): Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire. London: Routledge.  
45 Seo, D. et al. (2008): Role of serotonin and dopamine system interactions in the neurobiology 
of impulsive aggression and its comorbidity with other clinical disorders. Aggression and Violent 
Behavior, 13:5, 383-395; Ryding, E. et al. (2008): The role of dopamine and serotonin in suicidal 
behaviour and aggression. Progress in Brain Research, 172, 307-315. 
46 Schulz, K.P. et al. (1997): Plasma Cortisol and Aggression in Boys with ADHD. Journal of the 
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 36:5, 605-609; Pompa, A. et al. (2007): 
Cortisol Moderates in the Relationship between Testosterone and Aggression in Delinquent Male 
Adolescents. Biological Psychiatry, 61:3, 405-411. 
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Why do they adopt religion? 
Why is religion so important in this new form of terrorism, if we want to call it terrorism? For one, 
religion in the Middle East is much more prominent generally than in the West, where we have 
more secular societies. Also, in many Middle Eastern states religion and politics are intertwined, 
meaning one cannot separate them, such as in Iran or Saudi Arabia. This is one interpretation. An 
additional interpretation stems from research in psychology and would be that religion is often 
turned towards in desperate situations. People are known to turn religious when they lack the 
resources to cope with their situations rationally. Religion then provides comfort and hope.47 It is 
possible, maybe natural, that this is a common human reaction. In times of extreme helplessness, 
humans might turn towards a higher power, even if not proven, for protection and salvation. If 
we accept this interpretation, we would need to ask if it applies to the Islamic State? 
The Islamic State is an outcome of Al Qaeda and has its origins in Iraq. So, we can say it has been 
under attack since 2001 when the intervention in Afghanistan started. While it has gained strength 
after the US withdrew militarily from Iraq, it had been, and again is, under constant attack. This 
could possibly explain the extreme religiousness.  
                                                          
47 Pargament, K. I. (1997): The psychology of religion and coping: Theory, research, practice. New 
York: Guilford Press; Trevino, K. M. and K. I. Pargament (2007): Religious coping with terrorism 
and natural disaster. Southern Medical Journal, 100:9, 946-
947, doi:10.1097/smj.0b013e3181454660; Soenke, M.; M.J. Landau and J. Greenberg (2013): 
Sacred armor: Religion's role as a buffer against the anxieties of life and the fear of death. In: 
Pargament, K.I., J.J. Exline and J.W. Jones (eds) (2013): APA handbook of psychology, religion, 
and spirituality (Vol 1): Context, theory, and research. APA handbooks in psychology, 105-122. 
Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association, xxvii. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14045-005; Wink, P. and J. Scott (2005): Does Religiousness Buffer 
Against the Fear of Death and Dying in Late Adulthood? Findings From a Longitudinal Study. 
The Journal of Gerontology. Series B. 60 (4): 207-214. doi: 10.1093/geronb/60.4.P207; Soenke, 
M.; M.J. Landau and J. Greenberg (2013): Sacred armor: Religion's role as a buffer against the 
anxieties of life and the fear of death. In: Pargament, K.I., J.J. Exline and J.W. Jones (eds) (2013): 
APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality (Vol 1): Context, theory, and research. 
APA handbooks in psychology, 105-122. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological 
Association, xxvii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14045-005 
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When under threat and when no superordinate authority is present, it might make sense to believe 
in a higher power for protection. This might also explain the adoption of extreme Islam by the 
insurgent group the Islamic State.  
 
A number of studies suggest that religious beliefs are used to cope with [the] extreme 
stress …. For example, one small study of 28 patients with severe mental illness living in 
Maryland, investigators found that 47% of these patients indicated that spirituality/religion 
had helped "a great deal," 57% prayed every day, and 76% thought about God or 
spiritual/religious matters on a daily basis. ... In fact, the majority of patients spent nearly 
half of the time trying to cope with their illness in religious activities.48 
 
Religion is believed to be a common coping mechanism after trauma49 and against fear: ‘A primary 
function of religiousness is to buffer the individual against anxiety’50. Partly, this is explained with 
the belief, common in most religions, of an afterlife. This belief is thought to present psychological 
defences against the fear of mortality.  
 
moderately religious individuals feared death more than individuals for whom religion 
played either a central or a marginal role in life. … individuals who scored high on both 
belief in a rewarding afterlife and religiousness were less afraid of death than individuals 
                                                          
48 Koenig, Harold G. (2007): Religion, spirituality and psychotic disorders. Archives of Clinical 
Psychiatry (São Paulo), 34(Suppl. 1), 95-104.  
49 Pargament, K. I. (1997): The psychology of religion and coping: Theory, research, practice. New 
York: Guilford Press; Trevino, K. M. and K. I. Pargament (2007): Religious coping with terrorism 
and natural disaster. Southern Medical Journal, 100:9, 946-
947, doi:10.1097/smj.0b013e3181454660. 
50 Soenke, Melissa; Mark J. Landau and Jeff Greenberg (2013): Sacred armor: Religion's role as a 
buffer against the anxieties of life and the fear of death. In: Pargament, Kenneth I., Julie J. Exline 
and James W. Jones (eds) (2013): APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality (Vol 1): 
Context, theory, and research. APA handbooks in psychology, 105-122. Washington, DC, US: 
American Psychological Association, xxvii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14045-005. 
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who scored low on both. … individuals who are consistently high in religiousness fear 
death the least because they construe death as personally meaningful and derive additional 
comfort from the prospect of being reunited after death with people who were close to 
them.51  
 
Religion is thought to help cope with situations in which the individual (or here a group) believes 
not to have the resources to ensure its survival: ‘adherence to religious ideologies may buffer 
anxiety by providing people with attachment, structure, and hope, particularly when people have 
doubts about having the internal or external resources to obtain desired outcomes and avoid 
undesired ones’52.  
  
A possible model of emergence: Exclusion and the ‘defeat syndrome’ 
In individuals with some social support, meaning individuals which are better integrated into a 
strong community, there might be the capacity to respond to the same stressors that can be 
discussed for mental illness53 with the fight response rather than the flight response. This might 
explain why terrorists occur in areas where minorities are under threat (with ethno-separatist 
terrorism for example) and why terrorists are usually not schizophrenic. An exception might here 
be the lone wolf terrorist, who might be at the borderline between a schizophrenic response to 
                                                          
51 Wink, Paul and Julia Scott (2005): Does Religiousness Buffer Against the Fear of Death and 
Dying in Late Adulthood? Findings From a Longitudinal Study. The Journal of Gerontology. 
Series B. 60 (4): 207-214. doi: 10.1093/geronb/60.4.P207. 
52 Soenke, Melissa; Mark J. Landau and Jeff Greenberg (2013): Sacred armor: Religion's role as a 
buffer against the anxieties of life and the fear of death. In: Pargament, Kenneth I., Julie J. Exline 
and James W. Jones (eds) (2013): APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality (Vol 1): 
Context, theory, and research. APA handbooks in psychology, 105-122. Washington, DC, US: 
American Psychological Association, xxvii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14045-005. 
53 Cf. Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New 
Discipline. London: Palgrave. Causes of mental illness comprise: exclusion, isolation, trauma, 
deprivation, caused by migration, general low social status or other such factors.  
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prolonged stress and following isolation but might retain the capacity to choose the fight over the 
flight response.  
It therefore is speculated here that some of the principal social and political processes – trauma 
and isolation, exclusion and deprivation - that contribute arguably to the emergence of mental 
illnesses54, also contribute to the emergence of radicalisation, as the preceding stage for terrorism. 
If the radicalised individual is then recruited into an extremist group, this might counter the 
isolation and provide with tools to resist the perceived stressors (choosing the fight rather than 
the flight response). This might in fact protect against further mental illness and explain why 
terrorists are usually thought not to be mentally ill.  
The above mentioned psychological background serves to explain a model of terrorism causation, 
which I will present in the following. The main assumption is that the principal causes – isolation 
and trauma, exclusion and deprivation – that cause mental illness also are contributing to terrorism. 
The difference is that the radicalised individual, when joining a terrorist group, might be protected 
against further mental illness due to inclusion into a community. It might provide the individual 
with resources to resist, rather than further withdraw into mental illness.  
Terrorism is an attempt to solve a conflict. A misguided attempt, to be sure, involving the use of 
violence, but an attempt nonetheless. It has been stated that terrorism is the ‘weapon of the weak’55. 
How has this weakness been brought about? At the very beginning of a lengthy process leading to 
terrorism stands exclusion. Groups are being put in a minority position and marginalised56. This 
loss of status is then accompanied by material and social negative effects, such as exclusion from 
economic opportunities, geographic seclusion, and such57. The status of the excluded minority, 
                                                          
54 Cf. Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): International Political Psychology: Explorations into a New 
Discipline. London: Palgrave.  
55 Crenshaw, M. (1981): The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13:4, 379-399. 
56 Piazza, J.A. (2011): Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. Journal 
of Peace Research, 48:2, 339-353; Piazza, J.A. (2012): Types of Minority Discrimination and 
Terrorism. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 29:5, 521-546.  
57 Morrison, C. (2012): Grievance, Mobilisation and State Response: An Examination of the 
Naxalite Insurgency in India. Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security, 2:1, 53-75; 
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when repeatedly reinstated, leads to feelings of shame and frustration, which have long been linked 
to aggression in the psychological literature 58. The resulting aggression leads to oppositional 
behaviour, challenging the authorities responsible for marginalisation, by sometimes even attacking 
the majority population. This is usually responded to by repression. But in a game of tit for tat, 
this repression is responded to with further aggression59. If force is used to repress the revolting 
minority, violence might well be the logical response. When we ask terrorists why they commit 
their crimes, they usually answer that they respond to violent oppression with violence60. This is 
just the last stage in a process of escalation where one side is pushed outside the fringes of the 
social reference frame and striped off their privileges and resources. The difference to mental 
illness is that the fight response, rather than the flight (withdrawal) response is chosen, which is 
possible due to the existence of a supporting group. 
This process can possibly be observed in many cases of terrorism, from the RAF, to the IRA, to 
Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers and ISIS61. The process might be similar to that which leads 
particularly young individuals into criminal group activity. Different to schizophrenia, in terrorism 
it is always collectives that are finally affected. What also differs might be the scale of exclusion 
and marginalisation and the interpretation of this as an insult62. Lone wolf terrorists, finally, might 
                                                          
Kaarthikeyan, S. (2005): Root causes of terrorism? A case study of the Tamil insurgency and the 
LTTE. In: Bjorgo, T. (ed.): Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. London: 
Routledge. 
58 Beyer, A.C. (2014): Inequality and Violence: A Re-Appraisal of Man, the State and War. London: 
Routledge; Braithwaite, J. (1989): Crime, shame and reintegration. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Braithwaite, J. (2001): Foreword. In: Scheff, T. and Suzanne R.: Emotions and 
Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. Lincoln: iUniverse, viv-xv. 
59 Beyer, C. (2016): Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire. London: Routledge. 
60 Speckhard, A. (2012): Talking to Terrorists: Understanding the Psycho-Social Motivations of 
Militant Jihadi Terrorists, Mass Hostage Takers, Suicide Bombers & Martyrs. Unknown: Advances 
Press. 
61 The emergence of ISIS might be explained by the marginalisation of the previously dominant 
Sunni in Iraq after the US intervention and the intervention in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda. 
Possibly, this marginalisation and trauma is even further going back, as illustrated in Beyer, 
Cornelia (2016): Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire. London: Routledge.  
62 Victoroff, J. et al. (2012): Psychological Factors Associated with Support for Suicide Bombing 
in the Muslim Diaspora. Political Psychology, 33:6, 791-809. 
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be exposed to similar causal factors without integrating into a group while still retaining the 
capacity or willingness to respond with the fight response to their stressors.  
Economic Causes of Terrorism 63 
When arguing that a revised counterterrorism policy is needed, additional motivations for 
terrorism must be investigated. An effective counterterrorism policy should address these 
motivations, or ‘root causes’, of terrorism and thereby aim to reduce its renewed occurrence. 
While the connection between underdevelopment and civil war has been clearly established64, 
making a similar connection between terrorism and underdevelopment is more difficult. Part of 
the problem results from the structure of transnational terrorist groups because they operate across 
borders around all over the world. However, some successful attempts at showing a positive 
correlation between poverty in countries of origin and the emergence of terrorism from these 
countries have been made. Koseli, for example, showed a positive correlation between poverty 
and terrorism in the case of Turkey.65  
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita has presented more recent findings with regards to selected causes of 
terrorism.66 Some of these most discussed causes of terrorism are poverty and underdevelopment. 
As Bueno de Mesquita finds, the results are mixed but suggestive. On the one hand, Krueger and 
Laitin find that ‘wealthy countries are more likely to suffer terrorist attacks and that economic 
performance is not a statistically significant predictor of which countries terrorists emerge 
from.’67 Abadie finds no statistically significant relationship between per capita GDP and terrorism 
                                                          
63 This paragraph has been previously published in Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2014): Inequality and 
Violence: A Re-appraisal of Man, the State and War. London: Routledge. 
64 Collier, Paul (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. New York: 
World Bank. 
65 Mutlu Koseli, Poverty, Inequality & Terrorism Relationship in Turkey (Richmond: Virginia 
Commonwealth University, 2006). 
66 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective Overview of 
Recent Work,” (working paper, University of Chicago, 8 February 2008), 
2, http://home.uchicago.edu/~bdm/PDF/pe-terror.pdf. 
67 Alan B. Krueger and David Laitin, “Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and 
Targets of Terrorism,” in Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness, ed. Philip 
Keefer and Norman Loayza (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 148–73. 
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risk.68 On the other hand, several authors have found a ‘statistically significant negative correlation 
between measures of economic performance and the level of terrorist violence.’69 Also, Li and 
Schaub find that economic development in a country reduces terrorism in that country.70 Finally, 
it is known that failed states and less democratic states breed more terrorism and serve as safe 
havens for transnational groups, and a link between these states and underdevelopment can be 
made.71 Relative deprivation as a cause for terrorism has also been positively discussed,72 as has 
exclusion from globalization73. 
Another approach focuses on the economic situation of terrorists themselves. Krueger, Maleckova 
and Berrebi find that terrorist operatives from Hezbollah and Hamas are ‘neither poor nor poorly 
educated.’ 74  Usually they are well educated and come from relatively well-off backgrounds. 
Therefore, so the argument, improving economic conditions would help little to reduce the 
emergence of terrorism. However, this argument has been refuted many times over. For one, 
terrorist groups are complex entities, with their own internal hierarchies and structures. And it has 
been established that the lower ranks among these groups, such as the suicide bombers themselves, 
come from the unemployed poor rather than the middle ranks of researchers and technicians, or 
                                                          
68 Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” American Economic 
Review (Papers and Proceedings) 96, no. 2, (2006): 50–6. 
69 S. Brock Blomberg et al., “Economic Conditions and Terrorism,” European Journal of Political 
Economy 20, no. 2 (2004), 463–78; Kostas Drakos and Andreas Gofas, “In Search of the Average 
Transnational Terrorist Attack Venue,” Defence and Peace Economics 17, no. 2 (2006): 73–93. 
70 Quan Li and Drew Schaub, “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorist Incidents: A 
Pooled Time Series Cross Sectional Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 2 (2004): 
230–58. 
71 Susan E. Rice, “The Threat of Global Poverty,” The National Interest 83, (2006): 76-82. 
72  Caroline F. Ziemke, “Perceived Oppression and Relative Deprivation: Social Factors 
Contributing to 
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Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–44; Claude Berrebi, “Evidence 
About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians,” (Working Paper 
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leadership figures from the upper echelons of society. Also, it has been argued that terrorist groups 
apply strategies of recruitment similar to any business organisation: they try to select interested 
individuals who are the best qualified and best educated, who are usually not among the poorest. 
Finally, terrorist groups need not themselves be comprised of the poorest people in order to create 
a connection between underdevelopment and this form of violence; the connection exists if these 
groups adopt the plight of their fellow countrymen as a motivation to engage in political struggle.75  
 
Example Case studies 
Let us look, therefore, how economic measures and soft tools enhance the probability of successful 
counterterrorism at the case of deradicalisation in several Muslim countries. For example, Harrigan 
and El-Said write about de-radicalisation in Egypt:  
 
The initial response of the Mubarak regime to the insurgency of the 1990s was a harsh 
crackdown on Islamic militants and their sympathizers. In addition to rounding up the 
Islamists the regime also arrested family members, including women and introduced new 
anti-terror legislation which included the death penalty and limited detention without 
charge. Numerous terrorists were executed and torture was common in prison, as were 
extra-judicial arrests, military tribunals, arrests without warrants and prison stays without 
trials. In addition, the security apparatus were successful in dismantling the financial 
resources of the IG. Blaydes and Rubin … argue that initially these harsh measures 
produced the opposite of what was intended and spurred the Islamists onto further 
violence and garnered support for them.76  
 
                                                          
75 Beyer, Cornelia (2016): Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire. London: Routledge.  
76 Harrigan, Jane and Hamed El-Said (2013): Group deradicalization in Egypt: the unfinished 
agenda. In: El-Said, Hamed and Jane Harrigan: Deradicalizing Violent Extremists, 74-106, 80. 
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In Egypt, deradicalisation was mainly achieved by a ‘war of ideas’ or by countering the ideology of 
violent jihad. However, what is lacking is the economic ‘compensation’ side of the picture, which 
is why Harrigan and El-Said ask if this approach is durable:  
 
Thousands of former Jihadists have been released from Egyptian jails as a result of the 
deradicalisation process. Their reintegration into society is very difficult, particularly in 
terms of finding jobs and marriage. Many suffer from very bad social conditions and some 
have even demanded that they be returned to jail where the conditions were better. … 
Placing the onus on the Egyptian state alone would give rise to resource problems. It is 
estimated that as many as 30,000 former Jihadists have been released in a country which is 
already suffering from high unemployment rates. … Western countries with 
deradicalization programmes that result in releases from prison have well developed social 
welfare programmes for society as a whole and parole systems that these people could 
benefit from. The Egyptian experience is one of the few cases of deradicalisation in the 
Muslim world in which ideological reorientation is not combined with some sort of 
approach aimed at improving the person’s practical living conditions.77  
 
Therefore, Harrigan and El-Said write that economic factors – such as social welfare programmes 
and inequality reduction – need urgent attention if new recruits to jihadist groups and a resurgence 
of their struggles are to be avoided.  
El-Said also writes about Jordan, which took an even more repressive stance against radicalisation, 
with de-democratisation measures in particular, and concludes: ‘Observers of the developments in 
Jordan and of the country’s counter-terrorism policies are sceptical of the governments ability to 
                                                          
77 Harrigan, Jane and Hamed El-Said (2013): Group deradicalization in Egypt: the unfinished 
agenda. In: El-Said, Hamed and Jane Harrigan: Deradicalizing Violent Extremists, 74-106, 97ff. 
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reduce the threat of violent extremism. On the contrary, the nature of these policies … seemed to 
have caused more, not less, radicalisation in the country in general.’78  
Malaysia seems to have a more successful programme of deradicalisation that includes a strong 
focus on rehabilitation, including counselling on religious issues, motivational classes, 
psychological support, and a reintroduction to work, education, and social life with leisure activities 
and such.79  
About Yemen, El-Said writes: 
 
First, Yemeni authorities’ failure to spread wealth, and reduce poverty and inequities, and 
manage relations with its various ethnic communities and tribes is a reflection of the 
country’s weak development capacity. Developmentally weak states are at a higher risk of 
violent extremism than developmentally strong states. This is mainly because the 
environment in developmentally weak states, which are characterized by failure to manage 
economic growth, poverty, unemployment, inequities, as well as relations with their ethnic 
minorities, becomes more conducive to radicalization that in turn leads to violent 
extremism.80   
 
He concludes:  
 
First, developmentally weak states (which fail to manage sustainable economic growth, 
reduce poverty, create employment opportunities and manage relations with their ethnic 
communities) are more susceptible to radicalization. … Some Muslim-majority states, like 
                                                          
78 El-Said, Hamed (2013): Jordan’s response to jihadi salafism. In: El-Said, Hamed and Jane 
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79 Harrigan, Jane (2013): Malaysia: a history of dealing with insurgency and extremism. In: El-Said, 
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Malaysia, for example, have hitherto faced no major Islamic radicalization problems … 
Out of the eight Muslim-majority states studied … only Malaysia possessed a strong 
developmental capacity.81  
 
Discussion 
 
Building and Early Warning System  
It is an established finding that mental illness occurs after war and violence. For example, post-
traumatic stress disorder is a known outcome of experience of combat82. However, also other 
mental illnesses increase after war and violence, such as depression and even schizophrenia83.  
As mental illness is increasingly thought to be caused by trauma and following trauma, this makes 
logical sense. 
However, what would be interesting would be to look into the question if mental illnesses can 
precede trauma, hence war. If this would be the case, it would be easier to predict violence and 
war.  
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For one, one has to be very cautious about any correlations and distinguish in two aspects here: 
individual effects and group effects. Individual effects would mean to assume that any individual 
with any mental illness has a higher risk of becoming violent than any individual without any 
mental illness. While this is not at all generally assumed to be true84, some evidence points towards 
some suspicion that some mental illnesses pose a somewhat, even if very slight, higher risk of 
aggression.85 However, what is even more important for our purposes is the question if mental 
illnesses in an aggregated form, meaning in the percentage that they occur in any society, pose a 
risk for violence in this society, not necessarily caused by the mentally ill individuals themselves. It 
seems, and this is my novel argument, that this could be so.86  
If we would find that an aggregated increase in mental illness, such as depression, in any society 
also raises the risk for violence in this society, we would need to ask after the mechanisms behind 
this. 
Two options are possible here:  
1) More depressed individuals put a strain on the system – psychologically (contagion effect 
of depression), economically (more unemployment as mentally ill people might be at risk 
to lose their jobs), socially (for example because they need to be cared for). This might 
cause societal tensions, which might result in the outbreak of violence.  
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2) An increase in the rates of depression might not be more than simply a sign of another 
imbalance in the society’s health. For example, it might be a sign of increases in inequality, 
a weak economy leading to increases in poverty, failing social systems, or whatnot. Then, 
the rises in depression would be correlated rather than causal for the rise in aggression and 
conflict that leads to violence.  
In all likelihood, the effect contains both elements explained above. In any case this would allow 
us to take national mental illness data as the basis for a risk assessment for conflict, and in extreme 
cases even violence, such a riots, civil wars, coups etc.  
International data on isolation, trauma and even mental health are not widely available. However, 
the Washington Post published a global map of depression rates87, which shows abnormally high 
rates of depression in the Middle East and MENA region, where also the main part of todays 
terrorism is stemming from.88 This would mean that mental health problems turn more severe in 
populations where no resistance is possible and turn into political violence in populations where 
means to resistance persist. Furthermore, this would open up room for speculation that depression 
rates and other mental health problems could be indicative of future conflicts, like a canary in the 
mineshaft. It is known, for example, that the suicide rates in Germany before the First World War 
were abnormally high89. In the US, suicide rates were extremely high before the First and Second 
World War, but fell significantly in both wars90. Suicide is to 90 per cent caused by mental health 
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problems, foremost depression. It is striking, that for some of the states with current conflicts, 
depression rates are abnormally high (Syria, Lybia, Afghanistan, for example, but also Russia). This 
would support my interpretation that possibly the origins of mental illness and political violence 
are linked. As the above mentioned map was published in 2013, we do not know if depression in 
the population, if widespread, can be an early warning sign of conflict or simply does accompany 
conflict. Data provided by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) indicate that 
depression might rise before conflict., especially if the conflict is happening within the home 
country. The US is a special case, as depression rates rose here without a war on their homeland 
before the war in Iraq (however, it could of course be explained with 9/11). Russia is a special case, 
as with the Ukraine conflict depression rates fell.   
This observation, if it could be better supported, could possibly be very important. Knowing that 
depression rates increase before conflict could enable us to predict and prevent conflict in the 
future. It would, for example, be possible to monitor international depression rates and to 
intervene in countries where these rise with the help of NGOs, charities etc.  
Furthermore, depression, as stated above, is a common cause of suicide. As 90% of suicides are 
caused by mental illness, suicide data should give a fairly good idea on the mental health of a nation 
overall. It is interesting, therefore, that a map on international suicides published by the WHO 
does not necessarily confirm the above discussed map91. According to the latter map, suicides are 
particularly prevalent in Russia, India and some East African states, but less so in the Middle East 
and MENA region. In fact, the latter seems to be surprisingly protected against suicide.92  
                                                          
91  World Health Organization (WHO, 2015): Mental health. Online: 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/. 
92  This surprising and counterintuitive fact could possibly be explained as supporting my 
hypothesis, hence, that populations with depression in these countries are not withdrawing and 
isolating until the final flight from reality is suicide, rather they are integrated into communities 
that resist, engage in violence, and therefore turn the isolation and flight response back into a fight 
response. As it is assumed that not all individuals with mental health problems in these regions 
will engage in fighting, even a collective response with aggression and integration in such a 
collective might protect against suicide. Furthermore, the Middle Eastern countries follow a 
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Interestingly, as mentioned before, suicides have been particularly prevalent in Germany before 
the First World War93 and in the US before both world wars, but in both countries declined in the 
wars. It is difficult to interpret this factoid. However, a possible interpretation would support my 
argument: If these suicides were an outcome of widespread depressive illnesses, then this could 
mean that depression rates rise before a country experiences or engages in political violence (hence 
wars or interventions, or even civil wars). If this connection would statistically hold, this would 
give us a prediction measure for conflict. It would then be possible to monitor international 
depression rates and provide warnings about crises (where depression rates increase) so that actors, 
such as charities, NGOs etc, could intervene to prevent these crises turning into violent conflict. 
Table 3 presents depression rates for countries with and without violent conflict. It seems, 
according to these data, that high depression rates not only accompany violent conflict, but that 
depression rates also increase before violent conflict breaks out. As the table shows, not only are 
violent conflicts often accompanied by high depression rates in a country, and depression rates in 
a country decline after the end of violent conflict, also, in some Middle Eastern countries 
depression rates increased years before violence broke out. To make this point again: this could 
mean that we could possibly predict future violent conflict by looking at general depression rates. 
If this connection would hold, this could mean we could possibly create an Early Warning System 
based on monitored mental health data on an international basis.94  
 
 
                                                          
culture of collectivism. This might mean that depressed individuals generally remain more 
integrated, which might also explain the low rates of suicide. 
93 Durkheim, E.; Sennett, R. and R. Buss (2006): On Suicide. New York: Penguin Classics.  
94 If a serious rise in mental health problems in any one country would be detected, this could be 
responded to in various ways, such as intervention by NGOs or charities or foreign direct 
investment or whatnot (but not military intervention). In the long run, we could possibly create a 
an index to broadcast mental health data generally (there might be ethical issues involved here, as 
mental health data are sensitive, but if they would not be personalised, this might not be a problem) 
and to call for addressing underlying issues. 
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Table 1: Depression rates per country in specific years95 
 Afgh.96 Iraq97 Somalia98 Sudan99 Syria100 Libya101 Bosnia102 Russia103 Germ.104 Japan105 
1990 193037 55562 29274 133395 69247 29753 23215 843002 368569 342130 
2005 412544 92966 35671 202406 101975 44255 13185 882896 389551 363996 
2010 483152 108539 41673 231659 115064 49412 13921 817431 406367 344312 
 
The connection between rising depression/ mental illness rates and political violence is interesting 
enough to warrant further research. Also, this interpretation is not intended to claim that 
depression in individuals per se leads to aggression. However, high depression rates in a country 
seem to be a more likely candidate for predicting violence 
Hence, it is proposed here that it might be possible to create an Early Warning System for violence 
and war -  from coups, to civil wars, to foreign military interventions – from the mental health 
data gathered by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME106). IHME does provide 
over the most comprehensive collection of international data on mental illness, as well as other 
                                                          
95 Data calculated based on data provided by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
(IHME, 2015). Online: 
https://cloud.ihme.washington.edu/index.php/s/d559026958b38c3f4d12029b36d783da. 
Highlighted boxes mean countries at war in this year. Bold figures indicate a significant rise in 
depression. Italic figures indicate a significant decline in depression.  
96 While Afghanistan had been at peace in 1990, the US intervention started in 2001 and was 
ongoing in 2013.  
97 Iraq was at war in 1990, however, the war was mainly fought in Kuwait and only partially 
intruded Iraq. Iraq was subject to a US military intervention in 2003, which was still ongoing in 
2013. 
98 Civil war since 1991, failed state, insurgency. 
99 Civil war 1983 to 2005. 
100 Syria was stable until 2011, when the Arab Spring resulted in a civil war in Syria, which is still 
ongoing. 
101 Libya was stable in 2005, but the Arab Spring resulted in a civil war in 2011. It was stable in 
2013. 
102 Bosnia was stable in 1990, but was involved in a civil war in 1993. 
103 Russia was stable until 2013, when it was involved in the Ukraine crisis. 
104 Stable. 
105 Stable. 
106 Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, http://www.healthdata.org/.  
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related data. These data could form the basis for building a system by which war can be predicted, 
which could facilitate early intervention with soft tools to prevent war and violence erupting (see 
below). For this purpose, presumably, it would be beneficial if the data collection by IHME would 
be continued and intensified. One would need mental health data, as collected by IHME, on a 
yearly or ideally monthly basis. Otherwise, this system would not work. If we had monthly global/ 
international data, this would help us predict crises. Then, interventions via soft tools – such as 
foreign aid, diplomacy, medical aid, other support measures – could take place in countries in 
which a sudden increase in mental illness is detected (probably particularly depression is relevant 
here) to prevent crises erupting. Truly global data are needed, and they need to be provided on a 
yearly basis, or even more frequently, for fine tuning the early warning potential.107  
The following will be some basic recommendations for options to intervene with soft tools in 
countries with the goal to prevent violence erupting. These measures would particularly apply in 
countries devastated by civil war and resulting destruction and poverty.108  
 
Marshall Plan: Foreign Aid as a Tool against Terrorism 109 
Military force has been argued not to be effective against terrorism, at least not long term.110 As 
Jones and Libicki write: ‘Terrorist groups end for two reasons: Members decide to adopt 
nonviolent tactics and join the political process (43 percent), or local law-enforcement agencies 
arrest or kill key members of the group (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary 
                                                          
107 Even more frequent collections could be thought about for the future, depending on the 
national and local possibilities. 
108 For more developed countries, probably different and more advanced measures would have to 
be developed, even if some of the above tools would in all likelihood still remain beneficial, see 
the Excursion on Russia below for example. 
109 This paragraph has been previously published in Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2014): Inequality and 
Violence: A Re-appraisal of Man, the State and War. London: Routledge.  
110 Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2013): How Terrorism Ends. Understanding the Decline and Demise 
of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Crelinsten, Ronald (2009): 
Counterterrorism. Cambridge: Polity. 
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reason for the end of terrorist groups (7 percent), and few groups since 1968 have achieved victory 
(10 percent).111  
Early on, the primary tools in waging the Global War on Terror were military- and intelligence-
based, but non-military foreign aid has also been used to counter terrorism. In fact, U.S. foreign 
aid to developing countries increased under President George W. Bush. The primary recipients of 
this aid were Afghanistan and Iraq, where schools, hospitals and infrastructure have been built. 
However, using foreign aid as a counterterrorism tool is controversial. The main argument against 
foreign aid is the claim that most members of terrorist organisations like al Qaeda do not belong 
to the poorer strata of their societies. However, as the link between poverty and the emergence of 
terrorism is further drawn, non-military foreign aid will become increasingly important. 
Several studies have researched the relationship between foreign aid and terrorism. Not 
surprisingly, two studies strongly confirm the positive impact of foreign aid on the reduction of 
terrorism. Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas conclude that ‘targeted countries with global 
interests must bolster proactive measures through tied aid to countries where transnational 
terrorist groups reside. … because counterterrorism aid generates global benefits in terms of 
reduced terrorism for all targeted countries.’112 Azam and Thelen argue that ‘Western democracies, 
which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid, with a 
special emphasis on supporting education, and use military interventions more sparingly’.113  
Foreign aid is thought to have the greatest positive effect against terrorism within the countries of 
origin of this aid. According to a study by Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen: 
  
                                                          
111 Jones, Seth and Martin Libicki (2008): How Terrorist Groups End. Santa Monica: RAND, p. 
18f.  
112 Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed Younas, “Foreign aid as counterterrorism 
policy,” Oxford Economic Papers 63, (2011), 423–47. 
113 Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen, “Foreign Aid Versus Military Intervention in the War 
on Terror,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 2 (April 2010), 237–61. However, they also 
caution that foreign aid can be used by illiberal regimes to suppress political freedom and repress 
the population, which does not in fact help to decrease the emergence of terrorism. 
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The results confirm the effectiveness of foreign aid to reduce the number of terrorist 
attacks originating from the recipient country. In the host country, the impact of foreign 
aid may be different as counter-terrorism measures also influence the number of imported 
attacks. This finding suggests that there are incentive problems regarding the role of 
foreign aid, which must be not too intrusive in the policy of the recipient government. 
Foreign military interventions are also counter-productive and they seem to be a strong 
attraction factor for terrorists. A strong presence of foreign actors in the recipient country 
or foreign influence might in fact be counter-productive.114  
  
This not only confirms the positive impact of foreign aid on terrorism, but also provides evidence 
against the use of military means in the struggle against terrorism. Oppressive counterterrorism 
approaches within recipient countries of foreign aid have also been found to be counterproductive: 
  
The evidence suggests that repressive counterterrorism measures may not be the optimal 
way to fight terrorism. Government crackdowns and harsh repressive measures funded by 
foreign aid can create a societal backlash and lead to more support for terrorist groups and 
thereby increase the supply of terrorist attacks.115  
  
Therefore, the policies pursued by Western countries should increasingly include measures of 
support for developing countries in the critical regions and beyond. The West needs to help bring 
about increases in employment rates, improved education, better social services and health care. 
Only by spreading wealth to the Middle East and other suffering areas, the international 
                                                          
114 Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen, “Where to Spend Foreign Aid to Counter Terrorism,” 
(Paper for the 2011 Meeting of the European Public Choice Society), http://crem.univ-
rennes1.fr/EPCS11/submissions/epcs2011_submission_175.pdf. 
115  Burcu Savun and Jude C. Hays, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: Aid Delivery 
Channels, State Capacity, and NGOs,” (APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, 2011), 
25, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900690.  
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community will be able to drain the potential support basis for current or future terrorism long 
term. The West needs to refocus its efforts away from being centred on the military and intelligence 
towards an even stronger inclusion of softer and more cooperative means. 
In addition, as research seems to indicate that, for example, an increase in mental health conditions 
– such as depression, but also others – in any country can possibly predict the outbreak of (renewed) 
conflict.116 Hence, mental health should be taken seriously (but not as dogma) in addition to 
physical health in Syria and other post-war countries. It would be a normal occurrence of certain 
mental health conditions to increase after the experience of war. Also, it would be impossible, and 
not sufficient, to address such a development, i.e. an increase in mental health problems, with 
medication alone. While medications might be necessary for and wanted by some people, they 
should always remain a choice. Alternative options also should be offered (as soon as possible), as 
the experience in the West has shown that a reliance on drugs solely is often insufficient to treat 
mental illness. While a cessation of violence and a process of economic recovery, including full 
employment as soon as in any way possible, would be probably help relieve mental distress, 
additional options could possibly be considered 117 . They could include culturally acceptable 
therapeutic services, including alternative and new medical and therapeutic options that are 
available or becoming available in the West, sufficient supply with healthy nutrition that is high in 
nutrients (i.e. fresh produce) as this has also been shown to play an important role in recovery 
                                                          
116 Cousins, S. (2013): The Middle East and North Africe suffer the world’s highest depression 
rates, according to new research. Middle East Monitor. Online:  
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/8335-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-
suffer-the-worlds-highest-depression-rates-according-to-new-research-; Dewey, C. (2013): A 
stunning map of depression rates around the world. Washington Post. Online: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/11/07/a-stunning-map-of-
depression-rates-around-the-world/;  Durkheim, E.; Sennett, R. and R. Buss (2006): On Suicide. 
New York: Penguin; Silverman, C. (1968): The Epidemiology of Depression. Blatimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 149; World Health Organization (WHO, 2015): Mental health. Online: 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/. 
116 Durkheim, E.; Sennett, R. and R. Buss (2006): On Suicide. New York: Penguin Classics. 
117 Cf. Rothschild, Babette (2010): 8 Keys to Safe Trauma Recovery. New York: WW Norton, ch. 
6. Rothschild talks about regaining a close to normal life with small steps after trauma for recovery. 
The measures indicated here would be reasonable tools to facilitate these steps.  
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from mental illness, social facilities of all sorts to recreate communities: from community and 
recreation centres, places of prayer (i.e. mosques), libraries, to cinemas, to sports clubs118, etc., free 
media and, importantly, as wide as possible access to the internet. Other options might be thought 
about or demanded by the populations. Vitamins and other supplements are recommended as add 
on to medication. 119 Finally, mental health should not become an obsession replacing other 
development needs.120  
 
Excursion: How to respond to Russia 
As the Russian aggression in Syria was a major point of concern that could have sparked a truly 
global war, it is necessary to conclude with some remarks on Russia.  
First, In terms of security collaboration, Russia’s integration into existing Western organisations 
(such as NATO) has been discussed at another place121. This is thought to be a necessary step to 
prevent a fundamental antagonism (similar to the Cold War) re-developing or remaining and to 
help facilitate full integration of Russia into the Western system as well as to achieve some sort of 
potential of cooperation and synchronisation in the activities that are pursued in the military arena.  
So, with regards to the crisis about the Russian intervention, we should also make reforms in the 
international system to be able to avoid crises such as these in the future. The ‘missiles of October’ 
could maybe have been avoided if Russia had been at the time included in NATO. As argued 
above, theoretically, one would need a world state to finally abolish the Security Dilemma. This 
idea has been thought about by many recently. Alexander Wendt was a forerunner to the renewed 
                                                          
118 Rothschild, Babette (2010): 8 Keys to Safe Trauma Recovery. New York: WW Norton, ch. 7. 
119 Edelman, Eva (2001): Natural Healing for Schizophrenia and other common mental disorders. 
Eugene: Borage Books; Holford, Patrick (2007): Patrick Holfords Optimum Nutrition for the 
Mind. London: Piatkus, Tubman, H. (2004): Healing Depression Naturally. London: Kensington.  
120 For those who have made it to the West as refugees, the same principles apply, including 
integration into their respective welcoming societies. Cases such as the recent attack in Berlin 
illustrate that the social services helping with integration for refugees are in all likelihood not 
developed sufficiently and need more funding and capacities.   
121 Beyer, Anna Cornelia (2017): Abolishing the Security Dilemma: Why we need to integrate the 
militaries. Unpublished manuscript.  
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discussion about the world state with his article ‘Why a world state is inevitable’.122 It had been in 
discussion after the Second World War likewise, for example Albert Einstein was intensively 
engaged in it.123 On the other hand, liberals would probably argue that we have enough world 
state-ism with the United Nations system. Realists would argue that the recent crises showed that 
this was not enough. For realists, the United Nations are not strong enough to abolish anarchy. A 
solution that I am proposing, is to take a more pragmatic approach and look at the military 
establishments. I propose that we could abolish the Security Dilemma if we would integrate the 
military organisations.124 In particular, this would mean that we would need to integrate Russia into 
                                                          
122 Wendt, A. (2003): Why a world state is inevitable. European Journal of International Relations, 
9:4, 491-542, cf. also Bummel, A. (2010): Developing International Democracy. For a 
Parliamentarian Assembly at the United Nations. Berlin: Kommittee fuer eine Demokratische 
UNO; Schwartzberg, J. E. (2013): Transforming the United Nations System. Designs for a 
Workable World. Tokyo et al.: United Nations University Press; Archibugi, D.; Koenig-Archibugi, 
M. and R. Marchetti (eds. 2012): Global democracy. Normative and Empirical Perspectives. New 
York: Camrbidge University Press; Luis Cabrera (ed. 2011): Global Governance, Global 
Government. Institutional Visions for an Evolving World System. Albany: State University of New 
York; Hoeffe, O. (1999): Demokratie im Zeitalter the Globalisierung. Muenchen: C.H. Beck; and 
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123 Mazower, M. (2013): Governing the World: The History of an Idea. London: Penguin; Isaacson, 
W. (2008): Einstein: His Life and Universe. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
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Journal of the Nordic Studies Association, 39:1, 27-44; Craig, C. (2004): Glimmer of a New 
Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz. New York: Columbia 
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(1950): Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 2:2, 157-180; Herz, J.H. 
(1951): Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theory and Realities. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press; Jervis, R. (1978): Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30:2, 
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NATO and give it a membership.125 If the West is not confident enough about a membership for 
NATO, it could offer Russia a conditional membership, in which it has all the rights of a member 
as long as it complies with NATO rules. What is already in existence, though, is a partnership of 
NATO with Russia. My argument is that we need to go further and integrate Russia into NATO 
with a conditional full membership.  
Secondly, it is less likely that ‘reconstruction’ would also be a necessary measure towards Russia. 
Rather, according to the Human Development Index 2015126, academic excellence and knowledge 
exchange with the West might be lacking in this case, which is probably the reason for the lack of 
business capacity and creation of intellectual property (as for example illustrated in the 
comparatively negligible number of patents from Russia). This should then be remedied by 
inspiring intensive knowledge transfer.127  
 
 
                                                          
125 CF. Daalder, I. and J. Goldgeier (2006): Global NATO. Foreign Affairs, 85, 105-113; Mowle, 
T.S. and D.H. Sacko (2007): Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World. Contemporary 
Security Policy, 28:3, 597-618; Bunde, T. and T. Noetzel (2010): Unavoidable Tensions: The 
Liberal Path to Global NATO. Contemporary Security Policy, 31:2, 295-318; The Royal United 
Services Institute (2012). John Ikenberry Opposes a Global NATO. Online: 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xvm92n_john-ikenberry-opposes-a-global-nato_news. 
However, while these publications do speak for an expansion of NATO towards the East, they do 
not go as far as calling for an integration of Russia into NATO.  
126 United Nations Development Programme (2015): Human Development Report 2015. New 
York: United Nations. 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf.  
127 Tools could include:  
1) Creation of student exchanges with the West, similar to the Fulbright programme for 
exchanges between Germany and the US established after the Second World War.  
2) Creation of Chairs for Russia Studies (apart from Russian language, where some chairs 
already exist) in the West, such as the UK. For example, topics could include: Russian 
economy, politics, history, society, culture etc.  
3) The creation of one or more international universities in Russia, i.e. Moscow and/ or St. 
Petersburg, similar to the American University of the Emirates or other international 
collaborations.  
These measures are thought to be necessary for long-term economic growth as well as the creation 
of intercultural understanding and soft diplomacy between Russia and the West. Similar 
programmes had been created between the US and Germany after the Second World War.  
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Conclusion  
This article looked at the psychological and economic causes of terrorism generally with the hope 
to make this applicable to the case study, the civil war with ISIS in Syria, and civil wars more 
generally. 
First, the conclusion is that mental illness might be related to terrorism and that – in opposition 
to the mainstream opinion – terrorism might be explained at least by the same causes as mental 
illness. This leads towards using this knowledge for constructive purposes, and while this includes 
addressing mental illness, the other option is to use mental illness data more widely to predict 
future crises, such as civil wars. If we had an Early Warning System based on mental health data, 
we could possible predict and hence prevent civil wars by intervening in countries with rising 
depression rates early on.  
Second, a Marshall Plan is needed – as soon as the violence really has stopped sufficiently – to 
rebuild any country that has experienced war. A Marshall Plan is a programme of intensive aid and 
reconstruction, such as was applied to Germany after the Second World War. A Marshall Plan 
with regards to Syria had been in the discussion since 2014, when a Foreign Affairs article 
mentioned this idea.128 The idea has since then been taken on by various news outlets, and at the 
international level. In my view, it would help stabilise the country and would even help with the 
flow of refugees from Syria towards Europe. Prosperity can bring peace, as we also know from 
the literature on civil wars. Civil wars, such as we have seen in Syria, usually happen in countries 
below a certain developmental level.129 This does not mean that we should help the Islamic State 
more, as long as they are fighting, with foreign aid. But it means to build up the rest of Syria, and 
help even the Islamic State as soon as they stop fighting and start complying with human rights 
and other demands. Such a Marshall Plan could be a joint project between the Western powers, 
                                                          
128  Heffez, Adam and Noam Raydan (2014): The Syrian Marshall Plan. Foreign Affairs, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-08-27/syrian-marshall-plan.  
129 Collier, Paul (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. New York: 
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and powers such as China, Russia, and Brazil. These countries and others should join a truly global 
NATO, as this would help prevent interstate war. The Marshall Plan should contain intensive 
economic reconstruction aid in terms of infrastructure creation, finance and investment, job 
creation, education, good governance, but also other aspects of support, such as might be fulfilled 
by first NGOs and later by good governance: including a welfare state comprising social services, 
medical and mental health services, welfare services, disability services etc.  
 
